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ABSTRACT: The framework of Enduring Information Vigilance
will help ally and partner governments deny advantages adversaries
gain through their use of information operations in our new global
perpetual information environment. This approach recognizes the
persistent threat, unifies responses within and between governments,
and resolves societal fissures toward a more global democratic
information environment.

A

clear pattern of opportunism has emerged across Russian
and Chinese information operations. Exacerbated by the
pandemic, this adversarial activity will continue to characterize
the information space in the future. In an era of perpetual information
competition, and given the persistent nature of the information
threat, current paradigms and structures for countering hostile-state
disinformation in Western governments are inadequate. Western
democracies should instead organize their responses around what we
have deemed “Enduring Information Vigilance,” which recognizes the
perpetual nature of the threat, addresses societal fissures bad actors
exploit, overcomes bureaucratic hurdles to cross-government and crosssector collaboration, and fosters international cooperation toward a more
democratic information environment.
Hostile-state information operations, which Herbert Lin defines as
“the deliberate use of information (whether true or false) by one party
on an adversary to confuse, mislead and ultimately to influence the
choices and decisions that the adversary makes,” continue to confound
democracies.1 The use and manipulation of information as a tool of
influence began long before the 2016 US presidential election. But
information operations have become more potent in an increasingly
networked world, aided by the ubiquity of online targeting tools and the
anonymity and credibility the Internet provides.
Since 2016, the American public and private sectors have struggled
to address this challenge, stymied by domestic politicization of the
topic and legitimate concerns about balancing social media regulation

1. Herbert Lin, “On the Organization of the U.S. Government for Responding to Adversarial
Information Warfare and Influence Operations,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information
Society 15, no. 1–2 (Spring 2019): 2, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public
/lin.pdf.
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with First Amendment rights.2 As a result, disinformation has thrived
during the COVID-19 pandemic and left the country vulnerable to
manipulation through hostile-state information operations.

Perpetual Information Competition

Since the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of great-power
competition, Western democracies have conceptualized hostile-state
information operations as one-off occurrences—explained away by
societal peculiarities, tensions, and events such as elections—that
provide inflection points hostile states can attempt to manipulate.
Rather than organizing crosscutting, proactive, whole-of-government
responses, most Western governments stand-up extra capabilities only
when necessary, such as election war rooms before events like the 2018 US
midterms or the UK government’s response to the Russian poisonings
of Sergei and Yulia Skripal on British soil.3
In the United States, countering information operations has
been largely securitized, primarily involving elements of the Defense,
Homeland Security, and State Departments, in addition to the
Intelligence Community, but rarely, if ever, focused on domestic
audiences or involving the softer side of government, such as the
Department of Education. As the development of Russian and Chinese
information operations over the past decade-plus into the COVID-19
era demonstrates, this lack of whole-of-government approach misses the
bigger picture and inhibits an effective response.
Russia, China, and other authoritarian states have recognized the
utility of engaging in perpetual information competition, utilizing a
strategic-level integrated approach to information operations and “are
already contesting this domain and exploiting democracies’ inaction.”4
Hostile states understand information competition is the new normal,
and they are constantly probing for and exploiting societal fissures such as
ethnic or racial tension, pandemic uncertainty, and political polarization
to drive their ongoing campaigns. They use all channels available—
government and nongovernment, online and offline—when engaging
in perpetual information competition. Finally, hostile-state perpetual
information competition does not adhere neatly to international borders,
but rather exploits them, attempting to undermine the unity of alliances
and international organizations.

2. Karen Kornbluh and Ellen P. Goodman, Safeguarding Democracy against Disinformation, DIDI
Roadmap no. 4 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020), 9, https://
www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding%20Democracy%20against%20Disinformation
_v7.pdf.
3. Jonathan Owen, “Kremlin’s Web of Lies on Novichok Exposed by Government’s
Security Comms Team,” PR Week, July 25, 2018, https://www.prweek.com/article/1488558
/kremlins-web-lies-novichok-exposed-governments-security-comms-team.
4. Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman, “How Democracies Can Win the Information
Contest,” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 77, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com
/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2020/06/RosenbergerGorman_TWQ_43-2.pdf.
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Russian Information Operations
Building on the long history of Soviet active measures in the preInternet era, Russia has used the online information environment and
levers of offline information manipulation to drive division and distrust
abroad and undermine democratic processes for at least 13 years. The first
example of these modern information operations occurred in Estonia
in 2007 when the Kremlin exploited the ethnic Russian population’s
latent grievances toward the Western-oriented Estonian government.
“Putin’s regime started to consciously restore and rehabilitate the
Soviet symbols and Soviet version of history” through the primarily
state-backed Russian-language media in Estonia, creating a flash point
at a statue to Soviet World War II dead.5 The statue became the site of
violent demonstrations, and Tallinn became a target of cyberattacks.
According to Estonia’s internal security service, Russia carried out these
information campaigns “towards the Baltic States in order to prevent
anti-Russian moods and secure [an] increase in Russia’s influence in
foreign policy in the world.”6
Russia’s information operations continued. The next year, during the
five-day conflict between Russia and Georgia, cyberattacks—seemingly
emanating from Kremlin-encouraged patriotic hackers—crippled
parts of the Georgian government.7 Moscow also launched an all-out
information campaign that sought to call into question Russia’s role
in provoking the conflict and inspire fear and capitulation among
Georgians, to varying degrees of success.
Russia’s information operations in Estonia and Georgia occurred
before social media platforms developed the worldwide ubiquity they
enjoy today. If Estonia and Georgia were the beta versions of the Kremlin’s
online information operations, Ukraine felt their full effect beginning in
2013–14 with the Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity,
illegal annexation of Crimea, incursions of Russian-backed forces into
eastern Ukraine, and the downing of the passenger airliner Malaysia
Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014 with a Russian BUK missile.8 Russia’s
infamous troll factory, the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency,
had an entire unit focused on undermining Ukrainian sovereignty, the
legitimacy of the post-Maidan government, and international support
for Ukraine.9
5. Kadri Liik, “The ‘Bronze Year’ of Estonia-Russia Relations,” in Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yearbook 2007 (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2007), https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/web-static/053/Kadri_Liik.pdf.
6. Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual of the Security Police Board 2007 (Tallinn: Estonian
Internal Security Service, 2007), 4, https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html.
7. John Markoff, “Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar with Russia,” Bits (blog),
New York Times, August 11, 2008, https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/georgia-takes
-a-beating-in-the-cyberwar-with-russia/.
8. NATO StratCom Center of Excellence (CoE), Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign against
Ukraine (Riga, Latvia: NATO StratCom CoE, September 2014), https://www.stratcomcoe.org
/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against-ukraine.
9. David Patrikarakos, “The Troll: The Empire Strikes Back,” in War in 140 Characters (New
York: Basic Books, 2017).

20

Parameters 50(3) Autumn 2020

Like the Kremlin-sponsored information operations in Estonia,
Georgia, and Ukraine that preceded it, Russian online interference
surrounding the 2016 US presidential election had the goal of
“provok[ing] and amplify[ing] political and social discord in the United
States.”10 Through fake accounts and pages, illegally purchased online
advertisements, monetary support of authentic American activists
and protests, the hack-and-leak of the emails of Democratic political
operatives, and billions of organic online engagements, Russian
operatives were able to influence America’s democratic discourse ahead
of the 2016 vote.11 They built community and trust through positive
messaging and later used this influence to launch more ambitious and
divisive campaigns, including in-person protests.12
Due to the insufficient and tardy response of the social media
platforms and the US government in the wake of the 2016 election
interference campaign, Russia’s information operations targeting the
United States continue as the 2020 presidential election approaches.13
The Kremlin and its channels of influence have adapted their
information operations’ tools and tactics to the responses that have
been implemented, finding innovative ways around regulations in the
United States and beyond. In 2019 and 2020, Ukraine’s security service
uncovered evidence Russian operatives rented Facebook accounts from
Ukrainian users and organized a bot network utilizing 40,000 Ukrainian
and European SIM cards to field 10,000 accounts across the country.14

Chinese Information Operations
Understanding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach
to the role of information in great-power competition starts with the
regime’s ideological basis, which shaped the instruments of power
and led to the development of capabilities designed specifically for
political warfare. The regime relies on propaganda in all its forms to
legitimize itself, maintain support, and undermine its adversaries’ will.15
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invested in studying the impact
10. Robert S. Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
Election (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2019), 1:22, https://www.justice.gov/storage
/report.pdf.
11. Philip N. Howard et al., “The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United
States, 2012–2018” (working paper, Project on Computational Propaganda, University of Oxford,
UK, 2018), https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/The-IRA-Social
-Media-and-Political-Polarization.pdf.
12. Nina Jankowicz, “The Top Three Trends We Miss When Discussing Russian Ads,”
Alliance for Securing Democracy, May 15, 2018, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/the-top
-three-trends-we-miss-when-discussing-russian-ads/.
13. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearings before the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director
of National Intelligence), 7, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/os-dcoats-012919.pdf.
14. SBU, “СБУ блокувала роботу розгалуженої мережі ботоферм, якою керували з РФ,”
June 16, 2020, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/7698.
15. See the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
2019), iv–v, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019%20CHINA%
20MILITARY%20POWER%20REPORT%20(1).PDF.
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of information technology on the nature of conflict and learned from
US and allied experiences, incorporating doctrinal developments into
its approach.
Operation Desert Storm provided an ideal case study for the US
approach to a modern conflict against Russian and Chinese equipment;
it underlined the importance of using better technology to integrate
battlefield systems in order to create strategic advantage. But Chinese
strategists were also impressed by how the United States shaped the
narrative around the conflict, using Iraqi aggression as the justification
for military operations and employing psychological operations to
break the will of the Iraqi army.16 China implemented these lessons,
combining integrated network electronic warfare in close coordination
with influence components, such as propaganda and psychological
operations, in a single doctrine to achieve information dominance.
But it was in 2003 that the approach most associated with CCP
influence activities, the “three warfares,” was formally adopted by the
former General Political Department of the PLA.17 “Three warfares”
emphasizes three areas of impact for influence activity referred to in
political manuals dating back to Mao Zedong: public opinion or media
warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.18
Public opinion or media warfare uses the full breadth of traditional
and social media to influence overseas audiences. From state-linked
television and print outlets to paid advertising and senior figures’ op-eds
in major newspapers, media activity is supported by public outreach
organizations and efforts including Confucius Institutes, PLA-run or
civilian government-run visits, and exchange initiatives.19
The psychological warfare component aims to undermine the will
of adversaries to fight as well as promote division among and between
leadership, populations, and allies. Techniques might include media
activities, diplomatic levers, military deployments or tests, and the use
of front organizations such as government-linked think tanks.
The legal warfare component aims to establish the basis for
competition or the illegality of an adversary’s position. Examples see
Chinese government-linked delegates engaging in academic conferences
and legal debates about issues of strategic interest to China, including
nuclear issues, the sovereignty of space, or the application of international
norms in cyberspace.

16. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings
/CF145.html.
17. Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College Press, 2014), 29, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2263.pdf.
18. Peter Mattis, “China’s Three Warfares in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/.
19. Ethan Epstein, “How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms,” Politico, updated January 17, 2018,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms
-216327.
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The three warfares, however, are not the sole preserve of the PLA.
Other state bodies contribute to China’s efforts to influence the world
and discreetly assert political power over competitors. The Ministry of
Education leads efforts to instrumentalize the large number of Chinese
students studying overseas, the Ministry of State Security runs fake
think tanks and uses academic bodies to influence discourse, the United
Front Work Department leverages the Chinese diaspora for political
purposes, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others, uses
targeted advertising and media to promote the CCP position abroad.20
Despite some similarities in tactics, Chinese and Russian information
operations diverge in their intent; China does not opportunistically sow
division and inflame internal conflict in an ideologically agnostic way as
the Kremlin does, nor has the CCP been linked to attempts to interfere
in democratic processes as Russia has.21 China’s objectives focus on the
nation’s image and ensuring their point of view is heard, even through
subversive means. When Beijing has engaged in more aggressive
operations such as using fake content or instances of inauthentic online
behavior, these efforts have related to the CCP’s top foreign policy
priorities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.22

Exploiting the COVID-19 Infodemic

In a state of perpetual information competition, the uncertainty,
fear, and distrust that characterize the coronavirus pandemic present
an opportunity Moscow, Beijing, and other hostile-state actors have
exploited. For China, as the origin of the virus, this opportunity was
a foreign policy imperative requiring a response at scale and pace. For
Russia, however, the pandemic provided multiple new vulnerabilities to
exploit for sowing discord, spreading doubt, and subverting discourse.
Although news from mainstream outlets achieved greater distribution
overall than information from state-backed outlets, Oxford Internet
Institute researchers found Russian and Chinese state-backed content
among the most engaging content shared in late June 2020.23 This trend
underlines a key strategy of perpetual information competition: relentless
and opportunistic exploitation of security vulnerabilities, societal
fissures, and highly emotive content intended to drive engagement,
decrease trust in institutions, and further amplify division.

20. Mattis, “China’s Three Warfares”; and Amy Searight, “Countering China’s Influence
Operations: Lessons from Australia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), May
8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-australia.
21. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting
Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), https://www.hoover.org
/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance.
22. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer and Paul Charon, “Russia as a Hurricane, China as Climate
Change: Different Ways of Information Warfare,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2020, https://
warontherocks.com/2020/01/russia-as-a-hurricane-china-as-climate-change-different-ways-of
-information-warfare/.
23. “Coronavirus Misinformation Weekly Briefing,” The Computational Propaganda Project
(website), June 29, 2020, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2020/06
/ComProp-Coronavirus-Misinformation-Weekly-Briefing-29-06-2020.pdf.
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Russian Exploitation of COVID-19
Using practiced tactics, Russian officials and state-run media were
quick to seize on the pandemic to drive further division in Western
democracies. The COVID-19 opportunity was particularly appealing in
the United States, where another divisive presidential election campaign
had just begun, and US government missteps could be amplified and
exploited to influence political discourse. According to the Alliance
for Securing Democracy, the pandemic was the most discussed topic
throughout the “Russian media ecosystem” for 14 weeks, from midJanuary to late April 2020.24 Narratives featured on Russian state-run
propaganda outlets have mimicked and amplified those in the US
domestic information space. Claims COVID-19 might be a US-created
bioweapon, or a future vaccine against the virus would be used
to microchip and track Americans were among the most popular
coronavirus stories on the Sputnik news website in January to
March 2020.25
As yet, there are no confirmed instances of coordinated inauthentic
Russian campaigns around coronavirus, that is, campaigns utilizing
false personae or organizations, placing false ads, or employing bots for
inauthentic amplification of content. But narratives in Russian state-run
media have broadly tracked with those pushed by covert Russian online
properties in the past, suggesting such inauthentic campaigns may yet
be uncovered.
Russia has also utilized the coronavirus crisis for more traditional
influence campaigns as well as cybercrime. Like China, the Kremlin sent
aid, including personal protective equipment and ventilators, to hardhit nations. Moscow’s April aid shipment to the United States provided
President Vladimir Putin a domestic propaganda coup at home.26 An
earlier shipment to Italy—emblazoned with the words “From Russia
with Love” was part of a wider influence operation to undermine NATO
and EU unity, according to reporting by Italian newspaper La Stampa.27
Russian operatives have also used the panic and disruption of routine
cybersecurity amid the pandemic to launch widespread cyberattacks
against at least 31 companies, “including major American brands and
Fortune 500 firms.”28

24. Amber Frankland, Bret Schafer, and Matt Schrader, “Hamilton Weekly Report: April 18–
24, 2020,” Alliance for Securing Democracy (website), April 27, 2020, https://securingdemocracy
.gmfus.org/hamilton-weekly-report-april-18-24-2020/.
25. Andrew Rettman, “Russia’s Top Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Stories,” EU Observer, March
27, 2020, https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147905.
26. Anton Troianovski, “Turning the Tables, Russia Sends Virus Aid to U.S.,” New York Times,
April 2, 2020.
27. Natalia Antelava and Jacopo Iacoboni, “The Influence Operation behind Russia’s
Coronavirus Aid to Italy,” Coda Story, April 2, 2020, https://www.codastory.com/disinformation
/soft-power/russia-coronavirus-aid-italy/.
28. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Russian Criminal Group Finds New Target: Americans
Working at Home,” New York Times, June 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us
/politics/russia-ransomware-coronavirus-work-home.html.
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As the pandemic persists, so have Russian hacking efforts; according
to a joint US-UK-Canadian intelligence advisory released in July 2020,
the same Russian group responsible for some of the 2016 breaches at the
Democratic National Committee attempted to steal coronavirus vaccine
intellectual property and supply-chain information.29 The full effect of
Russian COVID-19 information operations is difficult to ascertain, as
their narratives converge with authentic grievances in American society
surrounding the virus and the US response to the virus. Regardless of
their source, over time, these narratives weaken confidence in authority
and trust in the government.

Chinese Exploitation of COVID-19
Since news about COVID-19 first emerged from the city of
Wuhan, the Chinese government has been actively trying to manage
the narrative and protect the legitimacy and interests of the Chinese
Communist Party, both domestically and abroad. In the early stages of
the pandemic, this strategy focused on suppressing narratives inside
China. The government-imposed nationwide quarantine was used as a
messaging opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Chinese
system and President Xi Jinping’s leadership.30
The suppression of virus information, however, ran afoul of the
Chinese public. Outrage developed in February and March about the
degree to which information was suppressed, including the crucial
understanding of human-to-human transmission. Normally strong
adherence to the party line by the Chinese people wavered with the
widespread coverage of the death of Li Wenliang, a doctor who had
been accused of rumormongering when trying to warn fellow medical
professionals about the virus on social media in December. The story
made the front pages, even of official outlets, provoking widespread
criticism of the Wuhan authorities and a political backlash from Beijing
as the CCP sought to reassert control over the narrative.31
While suppression and censorship sought to maintain the domestic
legitimacy of the CCP, this type of activity did not represent a departure
from the party’s usual practice at home. These actions did, however,
set the stage for a fundamental change in the use of information
internationally in attempts to demonstrate the strength of China’s
response and the superiority of the Chinese system and to cast doubt
on the origins of the virus.32 This change in approach to international
29. “UK and Allies Expose Russian Attacks on Coronavirus Vaccine Development,”
National Cyber Security Centre (website), July 16, 2020, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk
-and-allies-expose-russian-attacks-on-coronavirus-vaccine-development.
30. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China and Coronavirus: From Home-Made Disaster to Global
Mega-Opportunity,” Globalist, March 16, 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/china-soft-power
-coronavirus-covid19-pandemic-global-health/.
31. Minxin Pei, “Will the Coronavirus Topple China’s One-Party Regime?,” Strategist (blog),
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 5, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/will-the
-coronavirus-topple-chinas-one-party-regime/.
32. Laura Rosenberger, “China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive,” Foreign Affairs,
April 22, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-22/chinas-coronavirus
-information-offensive.
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messaging was combined with a significant and high-profile effort to
provide aid and advice to countries affected, initially to Europe and
later to a vast majority of countries in Africa and in Latin America.
As domestic fatalities from the disease fell, China positioned itself as a
global leader on public health, engaging multichannel messaging activity
to promote its humanitarian stance.
Throughout the pandemic, China has used a variety of means and
tactics to engage audiences, including targeted ads by Chinese state
media to build a long-term audience through content focused on positive
cultural stories. In early 2020, these ads changed, reflecting significantly
enhanced efforts aimed at promoting articles related to COVID-19.
The content of the ads promoted China’s transparency and leadership
in the global response including so-called mask diplomacy, while also
promoting the personal role played by Xi. This positive messaging
then evolved into “misleadingly reframed events, and amplification of
conspiracy theories.”33
The shift apparently sought to cast doubt on the origins of the
disease by sowing multiple explanations in a manner similar to Russian
obfuscation efforts after the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight
17 and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. These efforts
promoted US culpability for the coronavirus, claiming specifically that
US military personnel taking “part in the Military World Games in
Wuhan in November 2019” brought the virus to China, thereby trying
to deflect blame and responsibility for the pandemic.34
In addition to the use of state-linked outlets to amplify false narratives
and conspiracy theories, other elements of the CCP’s international
communications during COVID-19 indicate a new appetite for sustained
engagement.35 Chinese diplomats rapidly increased their use of Western
social media platforms throughout 2019 but accelerated these efforts in
early 2020, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launching an official
Twitter account in late 2019.36 US government analysis of the followers
of these accounts found a large number of them were identical and had
been created in the same six-week period, indicating the coordinated
inauthentic use of fake accounts.37 The analysis also pointed to Chinese

33. Vanessa Molter and Renee DiResta, “Pandemics and Propaganda: How Chinese State
Media Creates and Propagates CCP Coronavirus Narratives,” in “Covid-19 and Misinformation,”
special issue, Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review (June 2020), https://misinforeview.hks
.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Ipedits_FORMATTED_PandemicsandPropaganda
_HKSReview.pdf.
34. Molter and DiResta, “Pandemics and Propaganda,” 12.
35. Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafer, “Five Things to Know about Beijing’s Disinformation
Approach,” Alliance for Securing Democracy (website), March 30, 2020, https://securingdemocracy
.gmfus.org/five-things-to-know-about-beijings-disinformation-approach/.
36. Abhishek G. Bhaya, “China Gives a Nod to Twiplomacy: MOFA Launches Twitter
Account,” CGTN, January 14, 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-01-14/China-gives-a-nod
-to-Twiplomacy-MOFA-launches-Twitter-account-NfiQHr2slW/index.html.
37. Laura Kelly, “U.S. Says China, Russia Cooperating to Spread Coronavirus
Disinformation,” Hill, May 8, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/international/496880-us-says
-china-russia-cooperating-to-spread-coronavirus-disinformation.
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messaging piggybacking off Iranian and Russian disinformation online
to amplify divisive or conspiratorial false narratives.
Inauthentic activity in support of Chinese messaging has not been
limited to fabricating followers of newly created official social media
accounts. Independent researchers have also found significant evidence
of covert activity promoting China’s interests and conducting messaging
in support of CCP objectives; investigations by Propublica since August
2019 have revealed a number of different social media manipulation
techniques.38 These techniques include Chinese-based marketing
companies using Twitter to boost the following of governmentrun news services; creating inauthentic user networks to boost the
following of state-linked media outlets; hijacking Twitter accounts to
tweet Chinese-language content critical of the Hong Kong protests
and COVID-19 conspiracy theories; and offering bribes to prominent
Chinese language Twitter users to post pro-CCP misinformation.
Using a platform such as Twitter that is largely inaccessible from
China to engage Chinese-speaking audiences indicates this sudden flurry
of online activity was apparently intended to engage diaspora audiences.
Other investigations detected inauthentic accounts amplifying Chinese
government talking points across multiple platforms including YouTube,
Facebook, and Twitter.39 As a result of this activity, Twitter took down
a network of accounts and attributed them as an information operation
run by the Chinese government.40
While the CCP’s appetite for using disinformation and online
deception to build strategic influence and interfere in other nations may
have changed, its inauthentic activity has so far been easily detected and
exposed. If, however, PRC activity were to influence its target audiences
successfully, three messages could damage international perceptions of
the United States as they relate to the pandemic: criticism of the US
domestic response versus Chinese response to claim the superiority of
their system; the use of mask diplomacy to promote CCP leadership
and benevolence while US and allied roles in supporting other nations
is ignored; and a belief of conspiracy theories that the United States is
responsible for the pandemic.
As the fallout from COVID-19 becomes clearer, the relationship
between China and the West could change rapidly, exacerbating
competition and potentially triggering an economic decoupling between

38. Jeff Kao and Mia Shuang Li, “How China Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then
Let It Loose on Coronavirus,” ProPublica, March 26, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article
/how-china-built-a-twitter-propaganda-machine-then-let-it-loose-on-coronavirus.
39. Benjamin Strick, “Uncovering a Pro-Chinese Government Information Operation on
Twitter and Facebook: Analysis of the #MilesGuo Bot Network,” Bellingcat, May 5, 2020, https://
www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/05/uncovering-a-pro-chinese-government-information
-operation-on-twitter-and-facebook-analysis-of-the-milesguo-bot-network/.
40. “Transparency Report: Information Operations,” Twitter, accessed July 31, 2020, https://
transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html.
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the United States and China.41 And in such a scenario, China’s vastly
increased pace and scale of information operations are likely to persist.

Enduring Information Vigilance

To respond effectively to this new normal of perpetual information
competition, governments must recognize and understand its
characteristics in terms of the doctrine and institutions at its source and
the fact that information competition has developed with the specific
goal of projecting influence and waging political warfare. Governments
should configure institutions, develop capability, and drive activity
in the framework of what we have dubbed “Enduring Information
Vigilance.” The framework explains how governments, through
capability building, coordinating via holistic and inclusive government
structures, and international cooperation, can work more effectively to
detect the vulnerabilities adversaries exploit, manage those attempts,
and ultimately deny adversaries any benefit. If effective, the denial of
benefit is a powerful tool, alongside the imposition of cost, in supporting
an approach based on modern threat deterrence.42

Capability: Beyond Discrete Campaigns
As the exploitation of the uncertainty surrounding the coronavirus
pandemic has shown, there is a rising baseline of activity to which
Western governments must be attuned. Developing situational
awareness requires ongoing monitoring, detection, and analysis of the
information environment to paint a threat picture of hostile influence
activity and warrants investing in the capability building necessary to
keep that picture current. Given the vast changes in the scale of both
misinformation and disinformation from ideological, commercial,
and other nonstate actors during COVID-19, governments will find
it harder than ever to identify hostile-state activity; indeed, legitimate
grievances across the whole political spectrum in democratic nations
are a particular target for Russian online activity. Ensuring hostile
states do not exploit divisive, but legitimate discourse requires building
government capability and understanding.
Tools for detecting online campaigns and inauthentic activity
have developed rapidly in recent years, and parts of the national
security infrastructure have adopted them. But none of these tools is a
panacea, and the military adage about the importance of having skilled
personnel is particularly relevant: “Don’t operate the equipment, equip
the operator.” Enduring Information Vigilance relies on skilled people
with a nuanced understanding of the threat, who are capable of applying
41. Patrick M. Cronin, Michael Doran, and Peter Rough, “Geopolitical Implications
of the Coronavirus,” Hudson Institute (website), March 13 2020, https://www.hudson.org
/research/15816-geopolitical-implications-of-the-coronavirus.
42. Vytautas Keršanskas, Deterrence—Proposing a More Strategic Approach to Countering Hybrid
Threats, Hybrid CoE Paper 2 (Helsinki, Finland: European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats,
2020), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-2-deterrence-proposing-a-more
-strategic-approach-to-countering-hybrid-threats/.
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the full range of tools and techniques for monitoring, detecting, and
responding to information operations.
Several governments have already started raising awareness
and enhancing the relevant skills of their personnel: the Swedish
Civil Contingencies Agency produced a handbook for countering
information influence activities, and the UK government published
currently train public sector communications personnel on the
“RESIST” toolkit, which emphasizes the importance of understanding
the objectives of information activities when formulating appropriate
and effective responses.43
Moreover, building capability for Enduring Information Vigilance
should not be limited to traditional national security-focused
departments; hostile states have configured their institutions to
deliver across multiple channels, and the US response must be equally
coordinated. Training on detecting and responding to hostile-state
information operations should be required of all civil servants as a part of
their regular professional development, with more specific and tailored
development programs required for communications professionals and
those focusing on hostile states.

Coordination: All Sectors, At All Times
The breadth of activity under Russian information operations or
China’s “three warfares” approach spans the remit of multiple government
agencies; Western governments must break out of siloed national security
thinking, coordinate more effectively, and provide space for cross-sector
cooperation. From hard security and defense to cultural activity and
media, as well as many other realms of society not typically situated at
the forefront of foreign interference, hostile states have the potential to
exploit the inability of Western governments to work effectively across
traditional departmental boundaries. This “bureaucratic vulnerability”
can lead to poor information flow, competition for resources and
influence, or the exclusion of key stakeholders.44
Information operations comprising the use of multiple tools,
vectors, and activities in coordination (with malign intent), challenge
bureaucratic coherence and cohesion, exploiting blind spots and
targeting vulnerabilities. Bureaucratic vulnerability lies in the range of
ministries in which different states choose to place counter-information
operations efforts. Some nations focus on security institutions
considering adversary information operations a counterintelligence
challenge; some nations respond through ministries of interior—an
43. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Countering Information Influence Activities: A Handbook
for Communicators (Karlstad, Sweden: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2019), https://rib.msb.se
/filer/pdf/28698.pdf; and UK Government Communications Service, RESIST Counter Disinformation
Toolkit (London: Government Communications Service, 2020), https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk
/publications/resist-counter-disinformation-toolkit/.
44. European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Tackling the Bureaucratic
Vulnerability: An A to Z for Practitioners, Hybrid CoE Paper 3 (Helsinki, Finland: European
Center for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2020), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid
-coe-paper-3-tackling-the-bureaucratic-vulnerability-an-a-to-z-for-practitioners/.
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approach centered on protection and resilience; and some nations
place their efforts within the offices of prime ministers to reflect the
crucial need for coordination. And some nations have created entirely
new structures that face branding, communications, and legitimacy
challenges.45
These shortcomings emphasize the need to work more effectively
across government. Newly built capabilities required for monitoring,
detecting, and understanding the multiple elements of hostile
information activities—and associated intelligence and analysis—must
be integrated to advance a shared view of what adversaries are doing,
whom they are targeting, and whether these activities are effective.
Further, this information must be shared with nontraditional security
departments via leads with the necessary security clearances.
Building this situational awareness across the government will
enable the prioritized coordination of effective responses in the short
term and beyond, including the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Policy
and operational levers for ameliorating vulnerabilities and building
resilience against information threats in the long term lie with ministries
of education, health, and local government; they require policies that
ensure a thriving and pluralistic media, societal awareness of the threat,
robust media and digital literacy, and an understanding of civics.46
In addition to a truly whole-of-government approach, Enduring
Information Vigilance requires governments to initiate and create
space for a whole-of-society response to the problem. Governments
should convene regular meetings and establish communication and
collaboration channels across the public, private, nonprofit, media, and
academic sectors. Ideally, governments would facilitate cross-sector
cooperation and trust through grant programs requiring collaboration and
cost-sharing among grantees, eliminating duplication and competition
that exists between many organizations in the counterinformation
operations space. Particularly in the social media space, these programs
would place special emphasis on information sharing to detect and combat
cross-platform information campaigns. Such partnerships would build
societal resilience to information operations, investing in awareness
building and media and digital literacy programming, and identify
trusted third parties to deliver these messages to the general public.
Ultimately, healing societal fissures takes an ethos of understanding and
service across systems, which a persistent, wide-reaching strategy like
Enduring Information Vigilance can build over time.

45. Nina Jankowicz, Avoiding the Band-Aid Effect in Institutional Responses to Disinformation and
Hybrid Threats, Policy Paper no. 21 (Washington, DC: Alliance for Securing Democracy, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States, August 2019), https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp
-content/uploads/2019/08/Jankowicz-Bandaid-Effect-paper.pdf.
46. Nina Jankowicz, “The Disinformation Vaccination,” Wilson Quarterly (Winter 2018), https://
www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-disinformation-age/the-disinformation-vaccination/.
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Cooperation: International Partnership
Hostile influence activities have never occurred at such a scale
before. Any deterrent effect of Enhanced Information Vigilance is
augmented by demonstrating resolve and denying benefit to adversaries
through a collective stance against their activities, including better
sharing of information and knowledge to identify threats, tactics, tools,
and procedures and the formulation of effective responses. In the wake
of the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom
in 2018, the coordinated expulsion of over 140 Russian diplomatic
personnel from allied nations demonstrates how a well-coordinated
response can impose costs on a threat actor.47 Building cross-border
resilience and reducing vulnerability to deny benefit, however, requires
enduring cooperation and demonstrations of shared capability
and resolve.
Allies and partners can support Enduring Information Vigilance
in multiple ways: sharing analysis and assessments to understand and
counter threats; developing ongoing joint strategic communications to
engage hostile states’ target audiences; joint exercising of contingencies;
and creating issue-specific plurilateral groups allowing partners to
respond or put pressure on adversaries in specific regions or on specific
topics, such as a wildlife commission into wet markets.
Finally, adversaries use information operations to exploit open
societies and undermine shared democratic values; therefore, they must
remain the center of gravity for any approach to countering hostile
interference. Preserving these values and the transparency, openness,
and commitments to freedom of expression and human rights through a
community of democracies will ensure our societies continue to provide
an alternative to the authoritarian regimes of hostile states.

Conclusion

The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the West’s patchwork
response to hostile-state information operations and the need for
change. Western democracies must reorganize and reorient themselves
to address this threat through Enduring Information Vigilance
by investing in nuanced capability building, casting aside turf and
funding wars to coordinate more effectively across government, and
actively driving cooperation with allies and partners worldwide.
These structures cannot be built overnight; they require a long-term
commitment that will likely outlast the political class initiating them. But
the result will be a more resilient society that reassures its populations
and denies adversaries benefit, deterring malign attempts to exploit the
openness of democracy.

47. UK Government, “PM Commons Statement on National Security and Russia,” March 26,
2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-national-security
-and-russia-26-march-2018/.
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